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Sovereign Nothingness: 
Pyotr Chaadaev’s Political Theology
Kirill Chepurin and Alex Dubilet
Abstract This paper speculatively reconstructs the unique 
intervention that Pyotr Chaadaev, the early nineteenth-cen-
tury Russian thinker, made into the political-theological 
debate. Instead of positioning sovereignty and exception 
against each other, Chaadaev seeks to think the (Russian) 
exception immanently, affirming its nonrelation to, and even 
nullity or nothingness vis-à-vis, the (European, Christian-
modern) world-historical regime—and to theorize the logic 
of sovereignty that could arise from within this nullity. As a 
result, we argue, nothingness itself becomes, in Chaadaev, 
operative through and as the sovereign act and the figure of 
the sovereign, exemplified for him by the Russian emperor 
Peter the Great (1672–1725).
Ever since the interlaced exchanges between Walter Benjamin, Carl 
Schmitt, and Jacob Taubes, the discourse of political theology has been 
a space structured by a set of positions—and oppositions—around a 
set of concepts: nomos and anomia, justice and katechon, order and 
nothingness, sovereignty and exception.1 For Schmitt, it was famously 
the modern sovereign who decided on the state of exception (to the 
law) so that a lawful order could be (re-)established. More recently, 
from Roberto Esposito and Giorgio Agamben to work in decolonial 
and Black studies, many have diagnosed and explored the structure 
of the constitutive exception at the heart of Western modernity—the 
way the law (of progress, providence, salvation, universal history, 
etc.) depends for its workings on that which it excludes, represses, 
exploits, and covers up.2 From this perspective, sovereignty becomes 
the decision on such exclusions and serves to uphold the very power 
to exclude. If we recall also the discourse of the sovereign subject as 
specifically modern—grasped, for example, by Hans Blumenberg in 
the figure of the subject’s self-assertion as the foundation of the mod-
ern scientific worldview and the modern idea of progress3—we can 
appreciate how fundamentally modernity depends on the conjunction 
of sovereignty, law, and exception. The question of modernity itself—
the modern world as a structure of power and exclusion that we have 
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inherited—thus stands at the heart of political-theological discourse. 
Given that across the various inflections of political theology, sover-
eignty has been repeatedly seen as upholding order at the expense of 
the anomia indexed by the exception, an accompanying interest has 
emerged across contemporary theory: how to think the nonplace of 
exception without sovereignty, as ungrounding or fully disinvested 
from the work of the law (of history, humanity, or the world).
This paper speculatively reconstructs a unique intervention into 
this ongoing debate from within an early nineteenth-century Russian 
context—an intervention that likewise attempts to think the exception 
immanently, from within, affirming its full nonrelation to, and even 
nullity vis-à-vis, the Western, Christian-modern (world-historical) 
regime. However, instead of positioning exception and sovereign-
ty against each other—whether by way of the latter deciding on and 
repressing the former, or the former absolutely refusing the latter—
this intervention re-configures the logic of sovereignty itself, so that 
the sovereign act becomes an act of uncovering and affirming the void 
of the exception as such (as the void—without tradition, history, or 
law). Nothingness itself, thought of as totally ungrounding the histor-
ical-whole, here becomes operative through and as the sovereign act 
and the figure of the sovereign.4
For Pyotr Chaadaev (1794–1856), the philosopher who, in the 
1820s and ‘30s, offered the intervention that we here reconstruct, 
this was a way of thinking through—and then radically cutting—the 
Gordian knot of Russian political and national identity, which had by 
that time emerged in full force and which to this day looms over the 
country’s relationship to the West. This knot—the irresolvable ambi-
guity underlying Russian identity—arose from the ambivalent status 
of being at once a European power and embodying the figure of an 
(often dangerous, semi-barbaric, threatening) Other; at once a cultural 
colony whose intellectual culture drew on resources mostly borrowed 
from the West starting at least from the eighteenth century, and whose 
elite tended to study in Europe and speak French more frequently 
than Russian—and the center of its own empire, which at Chaadaev’s 
time rhetorically proclaimed its own tradition and its own religion to 
be competing with, and even superior to, the European (“in the joint 
spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality,” as Russian Minister 
of Education Sergey Uvarov’s 1833 programmatic formulation went). 
A country, then, which claimed to be a powerful, independent agent 
of history—but which, in the eyes of Chaadaev and many other 
Europeanized Russians at the time, had fed entirely off the European 
intellectual tradition and had nothing of its own to offer to the world 
or to world history. This ambivalence, as we will see, runs through 
Chaadaev’s thought itself, and ultimately finds a novel, radical reso-
lution.
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And while the resolution that Chaadaev offered itself became a 
part of subsequent Russian intellectual history—vigorously debated 
between, on the one hand, the Westernizers who sought to join Russia 
(back) with the European tradition and, on the other, the traditionalist 
Slavophiles who sought to create for Russia a distinct and separate, 
non-European identity—Chaadaev’s position remains unique vis-à-
vis its later influences and appropriations, and even vis-à-vis what 
we will detect as Chaadaev’s own Westernizing tendencies. It is not, 
however, our goal here to trace Chaadaev’s influence and significance 
within the Russian context. Instead, we seek to reconstruct speculative-
ly the political-theological dimension of his thinking and the concep-
tual problematic that he raises in his writing. What follows is not only 
interested in establishing the genealogical relevance of Chaadaev’s 
thought for the political theological debate, but also—and much more 
significantly—in tracing how the concepts forming the problematic 
connecting sovereignty, exception, and nothingness become twisted 
when their interrelation is probed through the lens of this “outsider” 
(a Europeanized Russian articulating his speech as programmatically 
outside the European context), one who is nonetheless a contempo-
rary of—and himself influenced by—the counter-revolutionaries that 
structure Schmitt’s famous explorations: Louis de Bonald, Donoso 
Cortés, and Joseph de Maistre. In returning to Chaadaev under the 
rubric of political theology, then, we are not seeking to explore the 
ways political authority may be religiously legitimated or to elaborate 
possible analogies between the theological and the political. Rather, 
we seek to rethink some of political theology’s constitutive conceptu-
al antagonisms. We find Chaadaev posing a set of crucial questions: 
How does sovereignty function without or in the absence of topos and 
nomos (and thus also of humanity and history)? How is the relation, or 
non-relation, between sovereignty and the nothingness of the excep-
tion re-configured once sovereignty is related to an anomian territo-
ry of nothingness, absolutely excluded from the law of history? That 
is, how does the nothingness of the exception transform sovereignty 
when the latter, so to speak, immanently draws on its force?
An Exception to the General Law of Humanity
In the first of his Philosophical Letters to a Lady, written at the end of the 
1820s in French and published in 1836 in Russian in the prominent 
Moscow social-literary journal Telescope, Chaadaev declares “we are 
a people of the exception [or: an exceptional people; un peuple d’excep-
tion].” (93/326)5 From a historical perspective, this claim—that we, the 
Russians, are a people of the exception—reacts precisely to the complex 
knot of Russian identity at the time: pretending to be a world-historical 
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power, but separated—in its history, religion, and mores—from what 
Europeanized Russians like Chaadaev considered to be the true locus 
of historical progress, namely Europe itself. It is this separation that, 
in a first approximation, Chaadaev’s declaration of “a people of the 
exception” indexes. However, in Chaadaev, this exception is declared 
so radically that it ceases to merely name the fact of historical separat-
edness of a given nation (Russians) from the broader European family 
of peoples. Here, exceptionality is something different than simply an 
indication of a special, exceptional characteristic, a supreme national 
trait differentiating one ethnos or nation from others. It is both more 
singular and more absolute than that. Chaadaev’s discourse indicates 
an exception to the entire structure of world history as a teleological 
space-time that brings together differential self-enclosed national par-
ticularities. As Chaadaev elaborates this position, which made him 
infamous and eventually got him declared a madman, we “are iso-
lated by a strange destiny from the universal movement of human-
ity.” (91/325) This exceptional isolation locates Russians outside the 
universal education of humankind, which is to say, outside of history 
and its temporal horizons: “We are placed as outside of time [comme 
en dehors des temps], the universal education of humankind [l’éducation 
universelle du genre humain] has not reached us.” (89/323)
The exception operates in more than one sense. It is an exception 
to the historical development of humankind across the providential 
movement of world history, indexing thereby an achronic persistence. 
But it also extends so far as to become a claim about a quasi-cosmo-
logical exclusion: “we do not in fact belong to any of the systems of 
the moral universe.” (198/433) More generally, it is an exception to 
the law, the general law of humanity as such. “Looking at us, it seems 
that the general law of humanity [la loi générale de l’humanité] has been 
revoked [révoquée] for us.” (96/329–30) The law that defines and trains 
the human across the time of its becoming-human, across history itself, 
does not apply. The resulting anomia is a state of exposure, in which 
the normative structures of the human and its guiding discipline, no 
less than the protection assured by the law, no longer hold. An excep-
tional state without nomos and even without topos (“Does not every-
one [in Russia] have a foot in the air?” Chaadaev asks, “It seems that 
everyone is en voyage” [90/323])6 that stands apart from and cannot be 
incorporated into the logics and laws of history. “We [are] alone in the 
world,” not as part of the world and of its horizon or the nomos that 
structures it—but alone, without communication with or participation 
in the movement of the law and the anthropogenetic process of histo-
ry; “we have given nothing to the world, and have taken nothing from 
it.” (96/330)
This state of exception has failed to contribute to the “progress of 
the human spirit [esprit]” and has not “taken pains to create anything 
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in the realm of the imagination.” (96/330) This dual failure is the exclu-
sion of Russia from the providential movement of history that has edu-
cated humankind to be what it is—the movement that, for Chaadaev, 
traverses the Orient and the Occident, moving from the realm of imag-
ination to that of reason. In this movement, Russia plays no role. To it, 
it contributes nothing. To have the general law of humanity be revoked 
entails thus a non-occurrence of a certain (seemingly natural) geo-his-
torical role: “situated between the two great divisions of the world, 
between the East and the West… we are meant to reunite within us 
the two great principles of the intelligent nature, the imagination and 
reason, and bring together within our civilization the histories of the 
whole globe.” A providential possibility of a grand teleological synthe-
sis is conjured—only to be immediately apprehended as a phantasmic 
projection that has not occurred. “This is not the role that providence 
accorded us. Far from it, it seems not to have been involved in our 
destiny at all.” (96/329)
For that synthetic destiny to have taken place, providence would 
have to have cared about nothingness. And yet, it did not. The result 
is not an imaginary and unreal teleological fulfilment, but rather a 
non-history and a non-time: “Our memories reach back no further than 
yesterday … The experience of the ages [des temps] is null and void for 
us.” (92/326, 96/330) The nothing has not been educated, but rather 
is excluded from the reproduction of the world across time, from the 
history that makes the human be what it is. It names the exclusion 
from the entire process of (re-)collecting the past and projecting into 
the future, which weaves together a unified and continuous temporal 
horizon and can be called the work of history, but also the work of 
tradition. There is a severance and separation, a detachment from the 
world and from history. Rather than the great teleological synthesis, 
one finds a state of abandonment.
The force of Chaadaev’s discourse—its importance as a fulcrum 
or theoretical pivot—lies precisely in those moments in which Russia 
and its people become a name for nothingness or the void, for a nulli-
ty—historical, moral, legal—defined through operations of exclusion 
and exception. Taking nothingness and exclusion seriously requires 
abandoning the logic of unity: to say that Russia is outside of time, a 
non-space, a nothingness—is precisely not to say that it is a national 
particularity with its own proper characteristics. It is not a unity within 
a field of unities, each held together by an idea or an essence, or a site 
within a historical order, but a non-space—not a moment within the 
unfolding of history, but a non-time. Nothingness cannot be added or 
superimposed to those determinations because it ungrounds their very 
logic: the amalgamation of national unity, providential history, and a 
spatial, mundane ordering. All of these are confounded by the declara-
tion of the non-place and non-time. As such, the discourse of Russia is 
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no longer simply a national discourse, but a discourse of nothingness 
as exception to law and to history—an exception to the mechanisms 
that assure their reproduction, accumulation, continuity. In disclosing 
Russia as a non-space and a non-time, Chaadaev’s discourse forces us 
to think the relation of nothingness to the unfolding historical ontolo-
gy of humankind.
What is to be done with this nothingness and its exceptionality 
vis-à-vis humanity and the world-historical law? This is the ques-
tion that Chaadaev’s discourse confronts. To what degree must (or 
can) the nothing be incorporated into the law or, by contrast, to what 
degree does that exception ultimately unground the standing of the 
law as such? It may be that the law—here not the juridical law but 
the philosophical law of history—is taken to be what carries within it 
the necessity and capacity of eliminating and overriding the real state 
of the exception; or it may be, by contrast, that the exception is what 
ungrounds the law, its universal applicability, the force with which it 
narrates history. Can this exception, the exception of nothingness with-
out a past and without a future—mark the interruption and break-
down of the narrativity of the philosophy of history and its normative 
force, which unites in itself a certain providential Christianity with a 
certain European modernity?
Chaadaev exposes nothingness, probing its anomic, atopic, and 
achronic dimensions—and yet the problematic that thereby emerges 
remains deeply ambivalent. It suggests two absolutely divergent tra-
jectories as answers to the question of what is to be done with this non-
time and non-space. The more conventional trajectory lays out a con-
servative solution of overwriting and negating the exception. A gap 
in the movement of history or in the unity-in-diversity of humankind 
cannot but appear, at least at first, as a defect, a lack to be re-incorpo-
rated into the universal unfolding of history. As we will see, Chaadaev 
certainly traces this path, especially in his Philosophical Letters: to follow 
it as a theoretical through-line leads to a classic portrait of Chaadaev 
as the originator of the Westernizing discourse that sought to align 
Russia fully with the West. This position exposes the nothing or the 
void only to overwrite it, to put it under erasure, by imposing on it a 
set of mimetic prescriptions that make sure that the exception, in the 
last instance, will follow the positive code and narrative laid out by 
the providential law of history. In this scenario, history’s redemptive 
promises extend themselves globally and universally over all possible 
exceptions, a Christian claim regardless of whether it is articulated in a 
Christian or secular guise.
The conceptual topography of Chaadaev’s problematic, how-
ever, also articulates a different exit, a radically countervailing solu-
tion. If the first trajectory identifies nothingness in order to overwrite 
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it and make it imitate the actualization of history in Europe, the sec-
ond instead affirms this non-space and non-time, the nothingness that 
Russia indexes. It affirms this nothingness in its immanence, which 
is to say as inherent to itself, decoupled from whatever historico-on-
tological determinations and narrative arcs that would determine it 
as lack. Rather than a negativity to be incorporated or sublated, the 
exception becomes a force of rupture challenging the metaphysico-his-
torical perspective on history, humanity, and the globe. This anomian 
non-space and non-time is apprehended as a force that, cartograph-
ically and chronologically, renders incoherent the idea of Europe as 
both Christian and modern, as the fulfillment of the theodicy of spirit.
What is held to in this trajectory is the basic assertion that Russia 
names, and persists in naming, the exception and disruption to the 
natural order of human kinship. As a being-without-history, it reveals 
the nature of historical and human universality to be a violent imposi-
tion and a mechanism of hierarchical differentiation. Here, the state of 
exception is not to be overcome in the restoration of order, but is what 
persists, exposing history itself as a ceaseless imposition of order on 
the anomic, achronic, and atopic territory of nothingness.7
The Figure of the Sovereign: Peter the Great
Unsurprisingly, things did not go well for Chaadaev following the 
publication, in 1836, of the first Philosophical Letter. At a time when state 
ideology was declaring Russia to be a powerful nation, politically and 
culturally independent of and even superior to the European powers, 
the text’s provocation could not have been stronger. The furor was so 
great that the journal in which the piece had appeared was shut down 
and the emperor Nicholas I officially declared Chaadaev a madman. As 
a response, in 1837, Chaadaev started writing his Apologia of a Madman, 
which remained unfinished, but is widely considered to be his second 
major work after the Letters. The relation of the law—the providential 
law of history—to the exception stands at the heart of both the Letters 
and the Apologia. In the theoretical vision laid out in the Letters, howev-
er, there is no (exceptional) figure of the sovereign that would institute 
or overthrow the law, at least not in modernity. It is the law of prov-
idence itself that functions as the un-overthrowable sovereign order 
destined to overrule every possible exception, including the absolute 
exception of nothingness. The workings of historical providence are 
presented here as so powerful that they require no additional interven-
tion of a sovereign act. It is the “interconnection of human ideas over 
successive centuries”—the very continuity of tradition—that “has led 
the human spirit to its present state” (89/323); the law is, as it were, 
self-fulfilling in a continuous, non-decisionist way.
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This holds, however, primarily for the peoples that are a part of 
or take part in “this history of the human spirit.” Seeing as this law 
does not hold—is absolutely “revoked”—for the people of the excep-
tion, the question arises how exactly, for Chaadaev in his Westernizing 
orientation in the Letters, the Russian terra nullius can ever be brought 
to conform to the universal. There is obviously no simple, continuous 
transition from nothingness to the law. Could this transition, then, con-
sist in a sovereign act—an act of forcefully overwriting nothingness 
and instituting the law on and over this anomic territory? This is, after 
all, the way modern sovereignty operates: decide on the exception in 
order to uphold the order to which the exception is posed as a threat. 
Such a sovereign act would return the nothing into the global order of 
humankind. This operation of sovereignty is, in general, what keeps 
the providential machine going when the latter encounters its outside. 
In other words, from this perspective, the Letters articulate sovereignty 
and the providential law of history together as part of a dual mecha-
nism that seeks to sublate every possible exception.
It is precisely in this role that the figure of the sovereign does 
indeed appear briefly in the first letter—as one who strives to over-
write the exception of nothingness with the West—only for this sover-
eign act to be overpowered and annulled by the atopic Russian void:
Once, a great man [i.e. Peter the Great (1672–1725)] wished to 
civilize us,8 and in order to give us a foretaste of enlightenment, 
he threw us the mantle of civilization; we picked up the mantle, 
but we never touched civilization itself. Later, a great Prince [i.e. 
Alexander I (1777–1825)], linking us to his glorious mission, led 
us victorious from one end of Europe to the other [i.e. during the 
Napoleonic Wars]; having returned home from this triumphant 
march across the most civilized countries of the world, we did not 
bring back anything except bad ideas and fatal errors… (96–7/330)
Sovereignty appears here as a supplementary mechanism for the pos-
sibility of associating with the already-established course of world his-
tory. The sovereign act is one of dealing with the exception by attempt-
ing to eliminate it, to transform the nothingness it indexes into a 
something, into a particularity properly partaking in the world-whole. 
Acting as a last resort, sovereignty seeks to reinstate the continuity and 
universality of history. However, in this terra nullius, it simply fails to 
take hold, to work. As Chaadaev is forced to admit, not even Peter 
the Great—this “greatest of our kings,” as the Apologia will call him 
(291/525)—could overpower the force of nothingness.
We can see, in this diagnosis, the tension between Chaadaev the 
Westernizer, who wants the Russian lacuna to be overwritten and so 
sympathizes with the efforts of the monarchs who tried to do so, and 
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Chaadaev the thinker of absolute, immanent nothingness in which 
all mechanisms of incorporation break down. This ante-historical 
void absolutely resists any attempts to draw it back into the normal 
course of history. Rather than genuinely resolving this ambivalence, 
the Letters ultimately allow the significance of the sovereign act to dis-
appear again behind the self-unfolding, unstoppable movement of the 
providential law of history:
… the more we will seek to identify ourselves with it [i.e. Europe], 
the better we will find ourselves. Up to now, we have lived com-
pletely alone… Soon we will be swept into the universal vortex, 
bodies and souls, that much is certain… Let us do what we can to 
prepare the way for our descendants… In this way, we shall have 
done our posterity a favor and shall not have lived uselessly upon 
earth. (198–9/434)
This indefinite deferral of the gap’s closure into the certain future—
together with the invocation of the vague “we”—indexes Chaadaev’s 
inability to think of any way to resolve the Russian gap, except 
through a renewed appeal and commitment to the providential law 
and its power to generate the universal future out of itself. What is, 
however, this “we” he invokes here, given that he has earlier claimed 
the full absence, in Russian existence, of any “we” in the sense of a 
people, a positive particularity, or a collective agent? In the absence 
of any mechanism of recollection, of any mechanism of tradition, how 
can the logic of accumulation across generations—implied in “do[ing] 
our posterity a favor”—even take hold in the Russian void? At the end 
of the first letter, an image of violently enforcing the overwriting of 
the exception is conjured up: “What is habit and instinct in other peo-
ples must be forced into our heads with hammer blows.” (92/326) But 
again, given that for Chaadaev all sovereign acts that attempted to do 
just that—Peter the Great’s forced “Europeanization” being the prime 
example—have shown themselves to have failed, it is rather unclear 
how this police function could become efficacious. In the Letters, sover-
eignty is offered as a mechanism for disabling nothingness in its atopia 
and achronia, as an attempt to satisfy the desire to incorporate this 
absolute exception back into the universal world-whole—but there it 
is also shown to fail.
Apologia of a Madman remains within the conceptual space of noth-
ingness, history, and tradition. However, instead of seeking to foreclose 
or overwrite this nothingness, Chaadaev now articulates its anti-tradi-
tionalist, subversive implications. During the time between the Letters 
and the Apologia, Chaadaev evidently continues to think about the role 
of the sovereign act vis-à-vis (the Russian) nothingness. In the later 
work, which constitutes Chaadaev’s attempt to explain himself and 
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the Letters, before the emperor Nicholas I in particular, the figure of 
the sovereign re-appears with a much greater prominence—and with 
a different logic and conclusion. But while the Apologia does, indeed, 
appear more loyalist and proclaims a new, messianic destiny for Russia 
that was absent in the Letters, it is much more than merely an apologet-
ic self-defense. Rather, it further radicalizes the conception of the abso-
lutely ahistorical nothingness, now turning this nothingness against 
history and the world. The tension between the Westernizing orien-
tation and the force of nothingness as precluding any Westernization 
escalates and ultimately implodes, leading to the radical reconceptu-
alization of the sovereign act as the force of nothingness itself. Instead 
of that which keeps the providential machine going, sovereignty in the 
Apologia will completely unground and destitute it.
At the outset of the Apologia, however, Chaadaev’s discourse 
seems to recapitulate the counter-revolutionary logic of suturing: the 
presence of the exception necessitates a sovereign power to (re-)estab-
lish the universal. It again takes the concrete form of Peter the Great, 
the monarch who, in his ultimate sovereignty, “abjured the old Russia 
in front of the entire world,” thereby inaugurating a “new era.” In this 
inaugural act, Peter does not decide on the exception—rather, he cre-
ates an abyss of discontinuity: “With his mighty breath, he swept away 
all our institutions; he dug an abyss between our past and our present 
and cast into it without distinction all our traditions.” (291/525)9 Here, 
the sovereign gesture is not merely a political one, or one of social or 
cultural transformation. It indexes an epistemic and temporal rupture 
that ungrounds Russia and evacuates its past. This appears precisely 
as the decision on the exception—and, in the Apologia, this act is pre-
sented as much more successful, at least at first, than in the first Letter. 
Peter “Westernized” Russia, and from that moment on, Russians 
never turned “our gazes away from the West,” inhabiting a being-
towards-the-West that, under the tutelage of “our princes,” led to all 
morality, ways of speaking and understanding, and even manners 
of clothing becoming Western. Finally, learning to spell “the name of 
things” through Western texts, Russia reaches a state of resemblance, 
of seemingly being included in the West (291/525). It is as if Peter’s 
sovereign decision makes possible a certain general education that 
results in Russia becoming a part of humankind through an imitation 
and absorption of the West. According to this logic, which has given 
Chaadaev the reputation of being one of the Westernizers, Peter stands 
for a break between an old traditional Russia and the Western orienta-
tion of modern Russia.
Here, then, we still encounter the logic of sovereignty as a mecha-
nism for overwriting nothingness in its atopia and achronia. Sovereignty 
acts as a mechanism for securing the providential machine of world 
history that culminates in the Christian West. It is required to deal with 
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the exception, whose nothingness otherwise threatens to undermine 
the providential development of humankind. Sovereignty is what 
assures the perpetuation of the world as history, against all corrosive 
power of nothingness. It is the culminating moment of incorporation 
and upholds the world-historical machine when the latter encounters 
what is exceptional to it. To focus on this logic within Chaadaev’s dis-
course is to avow nothingness as exception only to contain and resolve 
it through the sovereign act.
Nothingness Exposed
This logic of sovereignty, however, begins to come undone almost 
immediately in the Apologia, revealing in its wake a more complex 
conceptual morphology linking sovereignty and nothingness, one 
that fundamentally transforms the status and role of sovereignty in 
political theology. This path is inaugurated when one inquires after 
the conditions of efficacy of the sovereign act thus presented (as a com-
plete rupture with the past and, then, a turning towards the West). It 
might seem that, by saying that Peter abolished “all our traditions,” 
Chaadaev contradicts his earlier position in the Letters, which affirmed 
the complete emptiness of the Russian history. But there is, in fact, 
no reversal in the Apologia with regard to this emptiness. Chaadaev 
embraces it here no less decisively than in the Letters—along with the 
familiar image of the world-historical family against the backdrop of 
which the Russian absence of tradition is asserted:
History is not made by the historian, but by the force of things [la 
force des choses]. … Every member of the historical family, however 
obscure and insignificant, carries this history within the depth of 
its being. Precisely this history is what we do not have. (294/527–8; 
emphasis added)
Rather than being all-powerful, as it first appears, Peter’s sovereign 
act is predicated on the fact that it affirms a nothingness that precedes 
and exceeds it. What Peter the Great discovered was not a “rich and 
fecund history, living traditions, deeply-rooted institutions.” Rather, 
he “found at home only a blank sheet of paper.” The presence of gen-
uine history would have resisted the act of its radical clearing, made it 
visible as a violent imposition, a colonization, and ultimately rendered 
it inefficacious. Instead, “we had nothing in our past existence that 
could legitimate resistance.” (293/526–7) Rather than a particularity to 
be annihilated and incorporated (as another, re-fashioned particularity) 
into the universal education of humankind, what Peter found there 
was nothing. Such is the first condition of efficacy of Peter the Great’s 
sovereign act.
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Do not be deceived: however great the genius of this man and 
the enormous energy of his will, his work was only possible with-
in a nation whose past did not imperiously prescribe the path to 
follow, whose traditions were powerless to create for it a future, 
whose memories could be erased with impunity by an audacious 
legislator. (293/527)
In the Apologia, Russia persists in naming the absolute state of excep-
tion, absolute insofar as it marks an ontological foreclosure. It is “the 
force of things” itself that leaves Russia without history. Sovereignty 
appears as a violent act of erasure or subjection of the particular to 
the universal only under the assumption that particularity necessarily 
and essentially defines the territory. But it is precisely this assumption 
that Chaadaev rejects: what was there was not a particularity, but the 
nothing. Peter’s operation of starting from a blank slate emerges now 
as the affirmation of the real nothingness that precedes and exceeds 
the act itself.
Above, we saw Chaadaev state that Peter the Great “dug an abyss 
between our past and our present”—an image suggesting a sovereign 
destitution of the given, the sovereign potestas necessary for clearing 
the (non-)space before the nothing, thus produced, can be affirmed. 
Yet, insofar as Russia never had a tradition, Peter merely exposed the 
nothingness that preceded this exposure. There is here no resistance 
and no discontinuity—only a disclosure and affirmation of nothing-
ness that was already there, prior to the act, as the absolute state of 
exception to the universal law of history. What Peter destroyed, by 
contrast, was the phantasmic belief in a coherent (ethno-national-his-
torical) particularity (to be incorporated into the movement of the 
universal). Sovereignty here discloses the exception, the nothing. If, in 
general, the sovereign act is necessarily unconditioned, then in Peter’s 
case there is a very specific logic of unconditionality at work: his act is 
unconditioned because it is conditioned only by (the) nothing, affirm-
ing nothingness itself. It is not determined by the anomic nothingness 
as an object against which it reacts; rather, it asserts the primacy of ano-
mia vis-à-vis the positive order of the law. It does so, furthermore—as 
we will see—not in order to overwrite anomia with nomos, but to side 
with the nothingness that is anomic (and even antinomian, though 
without a determinate negation).10
The logic of sovereignty as exposing and insisting on the nothing-
ness that precedes it (and thereby, as we will see, generalizing its stand-
ing, by displacing the entire law to which it is an exception into its void) 
is confirmed by a strange achronic persistence of Russian nothingness 
across the Apologia. Each time sovereignty acts out of the nothing, in 
Chaadaev’s account, it does not contain or include it, or transform it 
into something. It allows it to persist, exposing its ante-ontological 
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primacy—exposing it as the Real that must be thought of as prior to 
the logic of history and tradition. Indeed, the interaction between sov-
ereignty and nothingness in the Apologia, (un)surprisingly, precedes 
the Petrine moment. At one point, Chaadaev refers to the example of 
the interregnum, the so-called “Time of Troubles” (1598–1613), which 
began with the death of the last Tsar of the Rurik dynasty and at the 
end of which the Romanov dynasty was established, the dynasty of 
Peter the Great and Nicholas I. The logic that can be glimpsed in the 
example is significant. The retrospective historical gaze “across this 
nothingness [ce néant]” (298/532), the nothingness of national history, 
finds a significant national event in the establishment of the monar-
chy, “a unique moment that cannot be admired enough, especially if 
one considers the void of the preceding centuries of our history”—a 
moment that “elevated the noble family that reigns over us.” (299/533)
On the one hand, Chaadaev is here celebrating monarchy and 
contrasting it with the void of the Russian past, seemingly present-
ing Russia as capable of belonging to the European peoples. However, 
this traditional reading of Chaadaev fails to consider that none of the 
Russian monarchs managed to overcome this nothingness (as we saw 
Chaadaev observe in the Letters), and the fact that Peter, a hundred 
years after the establishment of sovereignty, still found the Russian 
past just as empty—and affirmed it as such. Another hundred years 
later, Chaadaev himself diagnoses the same void so as to insist on it as 
an absolute exception to the logic of history and tradition, the excep-
tion that Peter had disclosed. There is thus another lesson to be drawn 
here: nothingness persists across all these moments of sovereignty up 
to the present. It is, in fact, outside of historical time, indexing a fun-
damental achronia, an ante-historical void that cannot be re-mediated 
by history.11
Sovereignty arises out of this non-being, and yet it does not 
establish any regular being in its place. Nothingness persists across 
the institution and enactment of sovereignty—revealing itself not as 
something that can be overridden by sovereignty, but something that 
the sovereign can only disclose and affirm. The nothing is first, not as 
a beginning, arche, or origin (of a developmental process), but a per-
sistent ante-archic force.
Chaadaev’s proclamation that he loves his country “as Peter taught 
[him] to love it” (299/533) should, thus, not be understood as loving it 
in its Westernization—neither a stubborn and passionate attachment to 
a particularity, nor an exaltation of its Westernizing incorporation, but 
loving it as an unsurpassable void and in its nothingness. By contrast, 
as Chaadaev’s discourse intimates, to love one’s country as a particu-
larity—as a something and not as a no-thing—is precisely to fall prey 
to a global logic of the exclusionary universal, to imagine oneself to be 
one of many that is universalizable, a harmony of difference radically 
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undermined by the presence of nothingness and the discourse of the 
exception. To love a territory in its nothingness, no longer interpreted 
as a lack or a retardation in the historical movement, is to see in it the 
force to unground the logic of (national) particularity and (world-his-
torical) universality. In this affirmation of the nothing that was already 
there, Chaadaev recapitulates in thought what Peter the Great had 
uncovered and enacted politically.
In light of this, Chaadaev’s assertion of the powerful, sweeping 
character of Peter’s act may be understood not merely as a rhetorical 
trope customary for modern representations of sovereignty, but, first 
and foremost, as pointing to how this act swept away what appeared 
as a history—but in truth was no such thing. Peter’s act of rupture 
emerges from this perspective as an immanent dispossession, a disin-
vesting from whatever semblance of history there was left, from what-
ever semblance of the proper that would cover up the impropriety of 
the void. It took a great sovereign not to be deceived by the appearance 
of a tradition and a particularity, but to see through it and reveal it as 
illusion. In fact, this is why Russia offered no resistance to Peter’s sov-
ereign act; the void of the past coincided, as it were, with “the void of 
our souls” (294/528). Rather than being an act of oppression and sub-
jection, Peter’s sovereign act exposed nothingness—in order to submit 
to it.
Submitting to Nothing, Beginning with Nothing
Peter the Great’s sovereign act consisted, in effect, in avowing and 
enacting the void at the heart of Russian history. According to this log-
ic, the sovereign act has the force that it does only to the extent that it 
enacts the nothingness that is already there—and through this affirma-
tion, sovereignty submits itself (lovingly) to nothingness and begins 
immanently from this nothingness. “If,” says Chaadaev, the absence 
of a proper history “is true, then it must be accepted, that is all.” 
(293/527) Russian (in)existence is a “purely material fact” (295/529), 
and the lesson of Peter the Great is that, having no history, “we must 
learn to do without it” (294/528). Peter “perfectly apprehended,” for 
Chaadaev, “what our point of departure [point de depart] on the path 
of civilization had to be.” (292/526) Once nothingness is exposed and 
affirmed, one need only to submit to it and to begin immanently from 
it: such is the second key aspect of Chaadaev’s reconfiguration of the 
logic of sovereignty.
This marks the Apologia’s most decisive departure from the Letters. 
Chaadaev’s move here is no longer to convert Russia into a regularized 
world-historical site, but to affirm it in its absence of topos, tradition, 
and history. Having to do without history becomes here not a negative 
scenario—something to be superseded and overcome—but instead the 
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only way to unground the world-whole, indelibly entangled in its own 
history to such a degree that tradition has become a burden. The his-
torical ontology of tradition remains in the background of the Apologia, 
but now no longer as something normative and desirable. Instead, 
Chaadaev programmatically declares the nothing as a disburdenment 
from tradition:
It should not be doubted that a great part of the universe is 
oppressed by their traditions, by their memories: let us not envy 
the constricted circle in which it flounders. It is certain that, in the 
heart of most nations, there is a deep sentiment of accomplished 
life which dominates present life, and stubborn memory of past 
days which fills the days of today. Let us leave them to struggle 
with their inexorable past. (301/535)
This is one of the most subversive things about the Apologia: its com-
plete undoing of traditional philosophy of history from within the same 
paradigm through which it was affirmed in the Letters, via precisely the 
(impossible yet real) immanence of nothingness. “I find,” proclaims 
Chaadaev, “that our situation is a fortunate one, provided that we 
know how to appreciate it.” (300/534) But what is to be celebrated or 
affirmed here? Nothing but nothingness itself: the fact that the Russian 
“we” inhabits its existence without history and without tradition—
and yet this withoutness is no longer apprehended as lack. Rather than 
a lack, it suggests now a relief from the burdens of tradition.
To uncover and immanently affirm nothingness is to acknowledge 
the fact that it is free from the normative temporal horizon of histo-
ry—that we cannot, from this standpoint, re-collect the past or project 
a future (the very movement that defines history and historical peo-
ples). The revocation of the general law of humanity includes, at its 
heart, the revocation of historical temporality, generational accumula-
tion, and national memory; in other words, the revocation of tradition. 
The immanent affirmation of nothingness entails beginning not with 
history but, as it were, prior to all temporal horizons. It entails no lon-
ger wishing what it does not have—but reducing itself affirmatively to 
nothingness. Seeing as “we” have failed to accomplish the movement 
of Bildung like “the other Christian peoples” (301/535), what is left is 
not regrets or making up for lost time. Rather, what is left is affirming 
an absolute division between the logic of reproduction of the West and 
the logic that the name Russia indexes: “from now on, it is necessary 
to remember to properly grasp the actual character of the country as 
it is given, as it is found in accordance with the very nature of things, 
and to make the most of it.” (301/535) It is precisely in this that the 
lesson of Peter the Great consists. If, however, the void is no longer to 
be regularized into a part of tradition, then what exactly can Peter do 
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about it? What does it mean, for Chaadaev, to “do without history”? To 
understand this, we need to turn again to what Peter did, now that he 
recognized the insurmountable force of nothingness in this terra nulli-
us and submitted to it.12 Beginning from nothingness—from the blank 
ahistorical void that persists across all sovereign decisions—trans-
forms radically the Westernizing logic of the Letters, even as the gener-
al world-historical orientation remains: Chaadaev does not want (the 
Russian) nothingness to persist only within itself, in utter irrelevance 
or abandonment, but wants it to become operative, without however 
partaking in the logic of history and tradition.
In the Apologia, Peter enacts a dual submission: to nothingness, but 
also to Europe. “He himself went into the countries of the West to make 
himself the smallest, and he returned the greatest among us; he bowed 
down before the West, and he arose our master and our legislator.” 
(291/525) Recapitulating a Paulinian logic of diminution, Peter sub-
mits to the West in order to be exalted as sovereign. In submitting to 
being educated by Europe, Peter should have transplanted European 
political models into Russian soil, becoming a typical European sov-
ereign and making Russia a typical nation. Yet, the transposition and 
displacement that occurs follows a distinctly different logic than incor-
porating nothingness into the West. The logic here enacts the displace-
ment of the totality of tradition, the very embodiment of the providen-
tial world-historical whole: “He passed over to us the West in its entirety, 
the way the centuries had made it, and gave us all its history for the 
sake of history, and all its future [i.e., the future generated by tradition] 
for the sake of future” (293/526; emphasis ours)—a futurity that now 
started to function as decoupled from tradition.
As part of his sovereign act, Peter took the western tradition as a 
whole, uprooted it in one fell swoop, and gave it over totally to Russia, 
divorced from this tradition’s continuity and reproduction. Here, there 
is no question of underdevelopment, of catching up, of joining the nar-
rative of history and the family of nations as one particular branch, as 
might be expected from an imitative relation to the West. (As Chaadaev 
writes, “it would be a strange misjudgment of the role that has befallen 
us to reduce us to clumsily repeating the entire long series of follies 
committed by nations less fortunate than us,” 300/534.) Rather, there 
is a total displacement and transposition of the Western tradition as a 
whole, the past as past, the future as future, into the ahistorical noth-
ingness—which can, paradoxically, “fulfill” it totally by being totally 
disinvested from it:
We approach every new idea with virgin minds. In our institu-
tions, …in our morals, …in our opinions, …nothing opposes 
the immediate fulfillment of everything good [tous les biens] that 
Providence destines for humanity. (300–1/534–5; emphasis ours)
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Despite Chaadaev’s use of the familiar term, providence itself does not 
here function as part of or via tradition anymore. Instead, nothingness 
ungrounds it and fulfills it immediately and totally (“everything good”), 
immanently refusing the mediation of tradition, of the accumulated 
historical past and the sutured-together unified temporal horizon of 
history. This “fulfillment,” and thus Russia’s role and calling—both 
notions now decoupled from the continuity of tradition—consist for 
Chaadaev furthermore in nothing less than the immediate resolution 
of all of the world’s most important social issues:
It is my deep conviction that we are called upon to resolve most 
of the problems of the social order, to accomplish [achever] most 
of the ideas that arose in the old societies, to decide on the most 
serious questions that occupy humankind. I have often said this 
before, and I will eagerly repeat: we have been constituted, as it 
were, by the very nature of things, as a true jury for many tri-
als pleaded before the great tribunals of human spirit and human 
society. (300/534)
Or, as Chaadaev puts it in one of his letters from 1834 (three years 
before the Apologia and two before the publication of the first Letter):
We find ourselves in a completely singular condition in regards to 
world civilization, and this condition has not yet been appreciat-
ed. When reasoning about European events, we are more dispas-
sionate, detached, impersonal, and, consequently, more impartial 
than Europeans in relation to all questions discussed. …The past 
weighs upon them unbearably, with the heavy weight of recol-
lections, experiences, and habits, and oppresses them, no matter 
what they do. (II 88–9)
This should be appreciated not as an excessive celebration of the per-
ceived Russian condition, but in the radicality of its underlying logic. 
The idea of a messianic destiny is by itself nothing new, but Chaadaev 
reframes it in such a way as to make it groundless. There is no ground, 
reason, or substance to support this kind of destiny; it is but a mobili-
zation of the real, atopian force of nothingness. There is no prophecy 
to be fulfilled, for nothing was promised. Indeed, it is precisely the 
absolute exclusion of nothingness from all possible logics of history 
that makes its immanent future out of this nothingness real. “For us,” 
Chaadaev programmatically claims, “there is no irrevocable necessity” 
(301/535), because it is precisely tradition and history that create such 
a necessity. “For us,” nothing is necessary. “For us,” only nothingness 
itself is necessary.
Although, as Chaadaev famously writes, Peter “found at home 
only a blank sheet of paper and with his strong hand wrote upon it 
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the words Europe and West” (293/527), he did not thereby make Russia 
catch up to the world-historical tradition. Rather, he proclaimed that 
nothingness was there prior to all inscription—and thereby affirmed 
and confirmed it as an absolute exception through this seemingly typi-
cal Westernizing gesture. To begin with the blank slate is to continue to 
be operative as fully detached from history, indifferently, with “none of 
the passionate interests” that define historical peoples (300/534). The 
point, again, is not to accumulate “our own” passionate interests, but to 
think from within the canceling-out of all attachment, without relation 
to any historical particularity or the horizon of tradition. This allows, 
in turn, to treat the tradition as a whole, the entire material of tradi-
tion, indifferently and without attachment—precisely as mere materi-
al, extracted from the logic of generations and temporal reproduction. 
This is what allows nothingness to “resolve the greatest problems of 
thought and society,” and that is precisely what Peter recognized.
The logic of Peter’s sovereign act, therefore, entails not the inser-
tion of nothingness back into the providential history of the world. He 
did not transform the Russian people into a normal people, a particu-
larity within the family of humankind. The logic of sovereignty is here 
not the containment of nothingness, but the exposure of its facticity 
and materiality, followed by the submission to this “purely material 
fact.” What we encounter is another bifurcation in Chaadaev’s prob-
lematic, a radical shift from the submission of Peter to Europe—and 
thus of modeling sovereignty on its European model—to a submission 
to the material force of nothingness, to that exception to nomos and 
topos that Russia has named from the outset.
It is as if Chaadaev emphasizes the success of Peter’s Westernization 
only to take it to such a radical extreme that the West itself becomes 
neutralized by the nothing. In transporting the whole of Europe 
into the anomic territory of the exception, into the ahistorical void, 
Chaadaev—with Peter—unmoors its normative standing as tradition 
and as law. It is in programmatic opposition to the tradition-based 
law of world history that, we would suggest, Chaadaev’s position-
ing of nothingness as the “true jury” should be understood—not as 
representing another, similar but opposed law, but as annulling and 
deactivating the law of history and tradition as oppressive, binding, 
violent, and all-too attached. Only through counterposing sovereignty 
that upholds the law with a sovereignty that affirms nothingness as 
the ante-historical Real which precedes and exceeds, and thereby fully 
subverts, the law (in this case: the law of history, succession, and tra-
dition)—resolving all social-political issues immediately and without 
remainder—can we really understand Chaadaev’s claim that “our sit-
uation is a fortunate one.”
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Between Sovereignty and Non-Sovereignty
To sum up the preceding analysis, in the Apologia, Peter the Great’s 
sovereign act and its significance consisted of three moments. First, he 
affirmed and freed up the force of nothingness in the Russian past as 
Russia’s “singular condition” and “the role that has befallen” it (a role 
fully detached, however, from the providential narrative of world-his-
tory)—an affirmative reduction to nothingness. Secondly, through his 
dual submission—to Europe and to nothingness—instead of grafting 
the zero onto the European tradition, he submitted the totality of tradi-
tion, the logic of tradition as such, to nothingness, resolving the world-
whole into it. He let the anomic, nonmediated, nondevelopmental force 
of nothingness become operative vis-à-vis the world-whole, uprooting 
it totally, in its entirety, so as to treat it wholly as the material to be 
dispassionately taken up and reconfigured. In turn, this gave rise to a 
different logic of futurity, one that proceeds, immanently and without 
mediation, from the nothing. No longer a world-historical synthesis 
proceeding from the logic of tradition and the particular traditions of 
the historical peoples, the future is, likewise, submitted to the nothing.
Importantly, nothingness is here that from which sovereignty aris-
es and not its object. Instead of deciding on the state of exception, the 
act of sovereignty is one in which the absolute exception of the void 
itself deactivates and overthrows the law of history and the logic of tra-
dition—an act of total displacement and ungrounding. As it resolves 
all of the world’s social problems entirely, immediately, once and for 
all, the operativity of this nothingness becomes nothing short of rev-
olutionary—despite Chaadaev’s monarchism and dislike of political 
revolutions. (This kind of overthrow of the very logic of modern phi-
losophy of history is, however, not a political revolution—but rather 
something like a total resolution of the world, its stripping of all tradi-
tion, an absolute disburdenment.)
This nonmediated, total resolution is not contemporary with the 
temporality of the world-historical law—instead suspending it as a 
whole. The achronic void is not contemporaneous with the world; it 
has no past or future that would move in line with the narrative of 
world history. “We have never,” insists Chaadaev, “lived under the 
fatal pressure of the logic of the times.” (301/535) The nothing is fun-
damentally non-contemporaneous with the law: it is not actual, but 
real. Accordingly, the futurity that can be claimed for this nothingness 
exceeds all imaginaries of progress (“we are allowed to hope for pros-
perity even greater than the one dreamt of by the most ardent minis-
ters of progress,” 301/535). Nothingness is conceived not as a starting 
point of a new history or a new series in history; it is non-foundation-
al—not an origination of a trajectory of development, accumulation, 
or mediation. Rather, it is the void into which the providential history 
and its reproductive systems are collapsed.
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In the third moment, as it were, of his sovereign act, Peter the 
Great pointed the way to this collapse—all that is left is, for Chaadaev, 
to bring it about. It is only in view of this, and in view of Chaadaev’s 
reconfiguration of sovereignty as the operativity of immanent nothing-
ness and the total ungrounding of tradition, that his call for a new sov-
ereign in the Apologia becomes comprehensible. Right after observing 
that the atopia named Russia has never existed under the pressure of 
the times and that there is for it “no irrevocable necessity,” Chaadaev 
claims: “to reach these final outcomes [résultats définitifs], we need only 
one single sovereign act of that supreme will …that more than once 
already opened [for Russia] new paths.” (301–2/535–6). It is easy to 
dismiss this simply as a loyalist gesture addressed to Nicholas I—
but that would mean to disregard the link between sovereignty and 
nothingness that has been forcefully constructed by Chaadaev by this 
point in the text. Faced with the modern world oppressed by tradition 
and marked by the constitutive exclusion, the collapse of the world 
becomes the only true demand—the only true resolution—and it is 
this demand that is expressed by Chaadaev’s call for the sovereign act. 
A messianic demand, perhaps, but one that is absolutely groundless, 
operative only immanently from within the nothing.
In the act of sovereignty thus conceived, the process of accu-
mulation, mediation, and succession that determines the trajectory 
of historical peoples (and chains them to it) is stripped of its power. 
Sovereignty acts here no longer as the culmination and the ultimate 
enforcement of the providential history of the West, but as the ante-on-
tological force that can uproot and deactivate it. In submitting to noth-
ingness, it becomes a figure of non-sovereignty, insofar as it marks the 
abdication of the sovereign imperative for order, for suturing it against 
all a(nti)nomian restlessness. This non-sovereignty is located in the 
force of nothingness itself, the very corrosive force that in the end has 
the power to make operative its exceptionality and, in so doing, to 
subvert the providential machine that unites, through a multitude of 
interplays, (the Christian) God and (the Western) Man. It is the excep-
tion itself that is the forceful, material, extra-historical, geographical 
fact—which cannot be decided upon or overruled. Peter the Great is 
a non-sovereign because his “decision” is guided by the facticity and 
materiality of nothingness. Here, sovereignty sides with and manifests 
the force of nothingness against the conjunction of Christian econo-
my and modern philosophy of history, a conjunction characteristic of 
counter-revolutionary political theologies of order.
It has been less significant for our analysis that this force of noth-
ingness is identified by Chaadaev with an actual political and social 
entity (Russia), and this non-sovereignty with an actual historical fig-
ure (Peter the Great). What we have traced is the very logic of sover-
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eign nothingness underlying Chaadaev’s reconfiguration of these two 
names—a reconfiguration that turns them from familiar and histori-
cal, into absolutely ahistorical and atopic, programmatically void. The 
significance of Chaadaev’s political theology is therefore twofold. On 
the one hand, it may be read as a powerful political-theological trans-
formation of Russia and the figure of Peter the Great—this decisive 
figure for all subsequent Russian history; a unique speculative theo-
ry of the Russian event. No wonder that Chaadaev’s emptying out of 
the Russian tradition, and his affirmation of this void as subverting 
the European tradition in its entirety, becomes subsequently a part of 
Russian revolutionary thought.13 More importantly, however—in a 
way that is not limited to discussions of Russia or the Russian con-
text—Chaadaev’s immanent, non-sovereign nothingness presents a 
subversion of the Christian-modern political theology of history, a sub-
version unparalleled in early nineteenth-century thought and remain-
ing singular to this day. In contrast to the modern sovereignty as 
indexing and upholding the logic of constitutive exception, Chaadaev 
advances a theory of the exception become absolute, an ante-historical 
Real which history excludes—but which itself becomes a real force (the 
force of the Real) in the figure of the (non-)sovereign. In its total break-
down of the modern relation between law and exception, Chaadaev 
points in his thought, often despite himself, to a total breakdown of the 
world of modernity in its dominant mode.
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Intellectual History: An Anthology, ed. Marc Raeff (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& World, 1966),160–173; and Peter (Pyotr) Chaadaev, Philosophical Works of 
Peter Chaadaev, ed. Raymond T. McNally and Richard Tempest (Dordrecht: 
Springer Science + Business Media, 1991).
6. For a fuller elaboration of this quote and the question of topos, see our 
“Russia’s Atopic Nothingness.”
7. If one interprets Chaadaev as a Westernizer, one interprets his discourse as 
an auto-colonial one that proclaims one’s own territory and not the territory 
of the Other as terra nullius, without past, without law, without history. In 
this, there is a partial convergence with the logic outlined by Schmitt, for 
whom terra nullius indexes a land open for appropriation within the modern 
European world order—emerging with the discovery of the New World. As 
Schmitt notes, “the emerging new world did not appear as a new enemy, but 
as free space, as an area open to European occupation and expansion.” In this 
new global order, “[l]ines were drawn to divide and distribute the whole 
earth” in a way that served to justify European colonial expansion. See Carl 
Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, trans. G.L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 
2006), 86–87. According to this logic, “the designated zone of free and empty 
space” is analogous to the state of exception and exposed to appropriation 
and colonization (Schmitt, Nomos, 98). Even in his Westernizer modality, 
what makes Chaadaev’s position distinct is his declaration that it is precisely 
the territory to which he, in some sense, belongs that is terra nullius. But 
this is hardly, as will become clear, the most theoretically-inventive part of 
Chaadaev’s discourse. The alternative trajectory, as we already proleptically 
suggest in the preceding paragraph, will affirm the non-space and non-time, 
the nothingness of Russia, as an exception that has the force to unground 
the nomos of the world and transform the very concept of sovereignty that 
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is, implicitly, aligned with it. Here, the state of exception, the terra nullius is 
not something to be claimed and appropriated so as to expand and uphold 
the order of the world as it is, but something that exposes the ineluctable 
violence in the law (of history) and the sovereignty that upholds it. As such, 
it becomes a discourse of terra nullius and the void in direct combat with 
that of Schmitt.
8. Peter the Great is so important to Chaadaev, and to Russian thought more 
generally, because he was seen as attempting to (forcefully) Europeanize 
Russia—to modernize its traditionalist culture into that of a powerful 
modern European nation.
9. The next section will return to resolve the apparent contradiction between 
this and the fact that, according to the Letters, Russia never had any tradition 
at all.
10. In affirming the primacy of anomian nothingness, Chaadaev’s discourse 
might be seen as siding, broadly, with the apocalyptic position elaborated 
by Taubes against Schmitt—if, that is, one can at all fruitfully compare 
a nineteenth-century Russian intellectual writing in French with a twen-
tieth-century Jewish intellectual writing in German. As Taubes astutely 
diagnosed, Schmitt’s position as a jurist was “to legitimate the world as it 
is”—an orientation that expressed itself, among other things, in the elab-
oration of the concept of the katechon, which “holds the chaos that pushes 
up from below.” Taubes’s famous response is: “I can imagine as an apoc-
alyptic: let it go down. I have no spiritual investment in the world as it 
is.” See Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul, trans. Dana Hollander 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 103. As Taubes elsewhere 
summarizes: “Carl Schmitt thinks apocalyptically, but from above, from 
the powers that be; I think from the bottom up” (Taubes, To Carl Schmitt, 
13). Although Chaadaev’s position, as we articulate it, is closer in this 
regard to Taubes’s vision, the distinctions are significant, including that 
for Chaadaev the affirmation of nothingness results in the transformation 
of the very concept of sovereignty. The remainder of the paper will artic-
ulate the nature of this transformation. In linking nothingness to a novel 
conception of sovereignty, one might see a partial resonance with another 
twentieth-century thinker, central, though in an underappreciated way, 
to the problematic of political theology, namely Georges Bataille. Early 
stages of thinking through Bataille from this perspective were present-
ed in Alex Dubilet, “Towards a Political Atheology: Georges Bataille on 
Sovereignty and Nothingness,” American Comparative Literature Association 
(Los Angeles, March 2018), which forms a part of an ongoing book project, 
tentatively titled Political Atheology.
11. This ante-historical void has not been re-mediated by history—and nor, 
as we shall see, will it be. Both the Letters and the Apologia invoke in this 
regard the image of the geological pre-history of the earth: “… if your 
life has not been powerful and profound, if the law which presides over 
your destinies is not a radiant principle, nourished during the great days 
of national glories, but merely something pale and dull, shunning sun-
light in the subterranean spheres of your social existence—do not, then, 
reject the truth, do not imagine yourself to have lived the life of histori-
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cal nations, when in fact, buried in your vast grave, you have only lived 
the life of fossils.” (298/532) This image connects to the concept of chaos 
and to Cuvier’s theory of geological catastrophe that precedes the life of 
the world as such: “There persists [in this, unconstituted life] the chaotic 
fermentation of things of the moral world, similar to the revolutions of 
the globe that preceded the present state of our planet. We are still in that 
stage.” (91/325)
12. To stress again, the logic elaborated here stands in opposition to the 
Schmittian logic insofar as it is no longer oriented towards the appro-
priation or colonization of terra nullius. Instead, it is here a question of 
affirming the primacy of nothingness and its anomic force, in a way 
that ungrounds the law and submits sovereignty to nothingness, there-
by transforming sovereignty’s very logic. One might recall, in addition, 
Agamben’s exploration of the contest between Schmitt and Benjamin over 
“the zone of anomie that, on the one hand, must be maintained in rela-
tion to the law at all costs, and on the other, must be just as implacably 
released and freed from this relation.” Our reconstruction of Chaadaev 
may be seen as siding with Benjamin—but, importantly, via a rewriting of 
how sovereignty operates in relation to that nothingness. If, as we identify 
below, there is a revolutionary kernel in Chaadaev, we might see in that 
a certain convergence with Benjamin’s articulation of the revolutionary 
force of divine violence over and against the preservation of the law and 
the world. However, whereas Benjamin—and, implicitly, Agamben in his 
discussion of Benjamin—prioritize inoperativity in relation to the law, this 
is not the direction that Chaadaev pursues. See Giorgio Agamben, State of 
Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
59 and 64.
13. Already Alexander Herzen crucially recognized Chaadaev’s importance 
for the socialist-revolutionary tradition—even though Herzen knew 
full well that Chaadaev himself was not, politically, a revolutionary. 
See Alexander Herzen, “On the Development of Revolutionary Ideas in 
Russia [1851/1858],” in Kathleen Parthé (ed.), A Herzen Reader (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2012), 14–15. As Herzen puts it, 
“Chaadaev’s letter was a sounding trumpet” for an entire generation 
of “young fighters [who] entered the arena” (15). As mentioned earlier, 
Chaadaev’s ideas become, of course, a part of basically all subsequent 
Russian modes of thought—the Slavophile no less than the Westernizing 
or the revolutionary.
